Guest Column: Avoid the failure trap

12 September 2011

CAP43_authorphoto_PeterMalingaPeter Malinga, Coordinator of technical services at the Government of Rwanda Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat (PSCBS)

Not all technical assistance is capacity-development support

Every year, members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) contribute some $25 billion to developing countries, much of which is aimed at delivering what is increasingly being referred to as ‘capacity development’. However, many of these interventions do not demonstrate any clear evidence that they are having the desired impact.

Every year, members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) contribute some $25 billion to developing countries, much of which is aimed at delivering what is increasingly being referred to as ‘capacity development’. However, many of these interventions do not demonstrate any clear evidence that they are having the desired impact.

A number of studies based on evaluations of the impact of capacity development programmes support this concern and highlight shortcomings in the efforts of development partners. These studies make it clear that despite substantial international investment, there is little evidence of clear development outcomes.

At the Government of Rwanda Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat (PSCBS), designing and coordinating the implementation of capacity development programmes has taught us many valuable lessons. We learned that technical assistance does not produce the desired development outcomes in cases where:

  • It has become a channel for ‘gap filling’ or providing substitutes for Rwandan staff. This results in poor knowledge transfer and a lack of sustainable impact.
  • No genuine capacity development assessments have been undertaken. This causes the capacity-development component of the programme to be too generalized or only equated with formal training.
  • The programme is rushed by fly-in fly-out consultants whose assignments are based on producing a report rather than on providing the necessary coaching, mentoring, and skills or knowledge transfer.
  • There is a lack of clear coordination between beneficiary institutions. This results in ‘silos’, where technical assistance is diverted into stand-alone projects that are poorly linked. This has led to overlap, duplication and a waste of resources.

Although international support for capacity development has no ready-made blueprint, I believe that in order to avoid the trap of failed capacity development, it is imperative that each recipient country should apply the following benchmarks:

  1. First of all, countries should take the lead and assume ownership of the design and delivery of any programme. To do this, they should define their priorities, clearly express their need for support and reflect on the lessons learned from previous programmes. They should also draw from the experience of best practices at home and abroad – Botswana, for example, is one of the few widely cited development success stories. Assisting capacity development is complex – and so calls for a practical approach. It is vital that a country’s leadership is at the helm of the process, because they know the background and context of their own national issues and can define their priorities.
  2. Technical assistance should always include a component of knowledge and skills transfer to local country teams. To do this, the design of the programme should show clear evidence of how skills and knowledge will actually be transferred. Experts brought in from other countries should be recruited on the basis of their experience and skills in coaching, as well as their technical skills. Their effectiveness in knowledge and skill transfer should be evaluated alongside their success in supporting delivery.
  3. To ensure value for money, strong public financial management systems and mechanisms should be set up. Development partners should feel confident that their support is well used, and the citizens of the country should be able to see the clear benefits of this support.
  4. Finally, robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks need to be put in place to drive the quality of the programmes. This will help them to be more accountable to the recipient country, to learn from what they are doing and to identify what the support priorities will be in the future.

The Rwandan government has used these benchmarks in developing its Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI). This aims to improve the performance in four priority sectors including agricultural productivity, electricity generation and distribution, and the mining sector.

Support for the SCBI philosophy is already evident. Substantial financial commitments have been received from the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the United Nations.

To achieve harmonisation of the efforts of the various development partners, a Government and Development Partner’s Coordination Group has been established. This group is guided by an aid policy that sets out how the government wishes to see the country’s aid architecture develop. It outlines preferences in terms of the type of aid it wishes to attract from abroad, and ensures that the country gets the kind of technical assistance that genuinely supports capacity development.

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[Resources]

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2006) The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working towards Good Practice. Paris, OECD Publications.

World Bank (2005) Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support. Washington, The World Bank.
 

Peter Malinga Coordinator of technical services at the Government of Rwanda Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat (PSCBS)
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